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PROPERTY -Mississippi TIDELANDS OWNERSHIP
-ARE THERE CLOUDS ON THE HORIZON?
Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State,
491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986),
cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1248 (1987).
INTRODUCTION
On May 14, 1986, the Mississippi Supreme Court handed down
their decision in Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State.! The case
came to the court as a quiet title action, involving a dispute over
the ownership of 600 acres of Mississippi coastal property.2 The
cloud to the title arose when the state sold to Saga Petroleum the
mineral leases of 600 of the 2400 acres to which the Bambini Part-
nership claimed ownership.' The land in controversy had previ-
ously been leased by the partnership to its mineral lessee, Phillips
Petroleum." The Cinque Bambini Partnership based its claim to
title on the boundaries of the record deed, which had remained
unchallenged and unchanged for 150 years.5 The state claimed
ownership by authority of maps prepared by the Mississippi Ma-
rine Resources Council.6 These wetland maps consisted of aerial
photographs with boundary lines drawn on them, and were record-
ed in the office of the Chancery Clerk. The issue before the court
involved determination of the boundary between public wetland
1. 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986); cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1248 (1987).
2. The court also addressed two related issues. The first concerned the validity of the original Spanish
grants to the property. The court held the grants invalid on the basis that the lands in issue had been previously
claimed by the United States. The second issue involved ownership of ninety-eight acres of submerged land,
which was brought into the ebb and flow of the tide by avulsion. The court held that the land remained vested
in the original owners.
For a general discussion of tidelands ownership, and other tideland concerns, see Comment, The Mississippi
Public Trust Doctrine: Public and Private Rights in the Coastal Zone, 46 Miss. L.J. 84 (1975); Porto & Teleky,
Marshland Title Dilemma: A Tidal Phenomenon, 3 SETON HALL 323 (1972); Note, Navigability- Its Meaning
and Application in South Carolina, 23 S.C.L. REV. 28 (1971); and Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas:
A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.I. 762 (1970).
3. Saga Petroleum U.S., Inc., is also a respondent in this case. 491 So. 2d at 511.
4. Phillips Petroleum is a complainant in this case. Id.
5. Brief for Appellant at 5, Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986), cert. grant-
ed, 107 S. Ct. 1248 (1987).
6. 491 So. 2d at 511.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
property and the property of the on-shore private landowners.7
After declaring the state's maps inaccurate and impermissibly used
to determine ownership, the court held that the state nevertheless
owned all property which at the time of statehood in 1817 was
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.' The rationale for the hold-
ing was the historically rooted public trust doctrine, which pro-
vides that lands be held in trust by the state for the benefit of the
people.'
As trustee, the state holds title to these lands in fee simple; its
interest is subordinate only to the interest of the federal govern-
ment to control navigation and commerce.1" These lands may be
alienated only upon a showing that a transfer would not contra-
vene public policy." While it is undisputed that title to these lands
vested in each respective state at the time of statehood, there is
some confusion as to which lands passed by the original convey-
ance. Two different tests have been employed in the determina-
tion of public wetland boundaries.12 The first is the traditional ebb
and flow test, which was the test of the English Common Law.
The second is the navigability-in-fact standard which has been
adopted by many jurisdictions, especially the inland states." In
the present case, the State of Mississippi, which has long consi-
dered itself governed by the ebb and flow doctrine, opted to af-
firmatively extend the ebb and flow test to include non-navigable,
tidally influenced waters such as those at issue in this case.'
The use of the ebb and flow test to determine public waters
represents a literal application of the common law of England.
This test is based on federal principles which the Mississippi court
considered too historically embedded to question. 5 By allowing
the state to use the ebb and flow doctrine to claim title to non-
7. Id.
8. Id. at 512.
9. Id.
10. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 212, 229 (1845); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842).
11. Miss. CONST. Art. 4, § 81; Money v. Wood, 152 Miss. 17, 27, 118 So. 357, 358 (1928).
12. There is some confusion as to whether the tests are different or not. This confusion stems from the
language used in the public trust definition. The English common law defines navigable waters as those where
the tide ebbs and flows. United States courts have, however, stated that due to the topographical conditions
in England, ebb and flow is but another way of saying navigable in fact. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387, 435-36 (1892); The Propeller Genesee Chiefv. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443,455 (1851).
13. The United States Supreme Court recognized that the only way that the inland states could enter the
union on an equal footing with those having tidewaters, would be to impose a navigability-in-fact standard
on all waters. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454 (1851).
14. Of the 140.863 acres held to be vested in the state by the chancery court, ninety-eight acres were lakes
formed by avulsion. The remaining forty-two acres consisted of eleven small drainage streams, and the north
branch of Bayou LaCroix. 491 So. 2d at 510. See appendix I.
15. 491 So. 2d at 516.
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navigable tidal lands, previously treated as private lands, the court
adopted an extreme position which is neither the majority view
nor an unquestioned federal rule. 6 By choosing the ebb and flow
standard over the equally accepted standard of navigability-in-
fact, the court set an important precedent which could force large
numbers of coastal landowners to take some action to secure their
titles. 7 Not only does the decision create the possibility for liti-
gation, it also may impose upon the state the substantial costs of
extensive surveys necessary to determine title boundaries. The
decision could also cost the state revenue in the form of lost
property taxes, since landowners may not continue to pay taxes
on property which the state could claim at any time.
INSTANT CASE
The Cinque Bambini case involved an action by the Bambini
partnership to clear title to 2400 acres of land located near the
Mississippi Gulf Coast. 8 When the state leased the mineral rights
to 600 acres of the record title land of the partnership, the part-
nership and others 9 brought an action in the Chancery Court of
Hancock County to confirm the title to the property. Bambini based
its claim to title on grants that had not been disputed for over 150
years. 20
The partnership traced its title to the property to the original
settlers, John T. Jourdan, Noel Jourdan and Pierre Carco." These
men had settled the land in the early 1800's and later had had the
property surveyed by United States Deputy Surveyor Elihu
Carter. "2
Subsequent acts of Congress in 1822 and 1830 confirmed title
and patents to the land were issued by the United States and the
16. The United States Supreme Court has questioned the soundness of the ebb and flow doctrine on several
occasions. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 182 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436 (1892); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870); The Propeller
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 458 (1851), cert. granted. 107 S. Ct. 1248 (1987).
17. In the present case, the costs of surveys undertaken to determine the marine boundaries exceeded
$300,000.00. Brief for Appellant at 7, Cinque Bambini v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986).
18. 491 So. 2d at 510.
19. Carroll W. Allen, Lydia Caroll, Hamilton Petroleum Company, Enserch Exploration, Inc. and Phillips
Petroleum Company, are all petitioners in this suit. 491 So. 2d at 508.
20. Brief for Appellant at 4, Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986). cert. grant-
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State of Mississippi.23 All of the 2400 acres claimed by the part-
nership were included in the record deed. The present owners
acquired the property through a series of transfers,2" all of which
conveyed the land from private owners to private owners without
any attempt to meander tide lines or recognize any of the lands
of the original grants as public property.2" When the partnership
brought suit against the state, surveys costing more than $300,000
were undertaken by the litigants to determine the tidal boundaries
of the property.26
The Chancery Court of Hancock County used these survey lines
to determine which lands belonged to the state and which belonged
to private landowners. The chancellor applied the ebb and flow
test to determine the extent of the public trust and found that the
state held title to all lands which were influenced by the tide as
far inland as the mean high water mark. 7 The chancery court strict-
ly interpreted the ebb and flow test and in so doing found the flow
of the tide to be the critical factor in determining wetlands' owner-
ship.2" By this ruling, title to 140.863 acres of the originally dis-
puted 600 acres was held to be vested in the state. 9
Following this decision, the Bambini partnership perfected an
appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court. Bambini contended on
appeal that the chancellor wrongly applied the ebb and flow test
in making his determination of public trust lands.3" The partner-
ship maintained that the proper standard for the determination of
public trust lands is the navigability-in-fact standard. 1 By this stan-
dard, navigability of a waterway is the critical factor in deciding
whether the land is of private or public character. Bambini urged
adoption of this standard, which holds that all waters which are
in fact navigable are public, regardless of tidal influence. The part-
nership contended, and the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed that
the navigability-in-fact standard is more logical and consistent than
the ebb and flow test. 2 The court refused to adopt the navigability-
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 7.
26. Id. at 8.
27. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 455 (1851). In England, the histori-
cal standard used to determine the navigability of a waterway is the ebb and flow of the tide. Id. In England,
however, the only waters that are considered navigable are those influenced by the tide. Id. The critical factor
for the determination of public waters in England is, therefore, unclear, as navigable water and tide water
are synonymous terms. Id.
28. 491 So. 2d at 520.
29. 491 So. 2d at 510.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 513.
32. Id. at 517.
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in-fact standard, however, on the basis that it is inconsistent with
the ebb and flow language of the English law. 3 Bambini further
alleged that the chancery court erred by not allowing the partner-
ship to retain ownership of 98 acres covered by the two artifi-
cially created lakes.3" The partnership premised this argument on
the fact that the lakes were brought within the ebb and flow of
the tide by the process of avulsion" and therefore should be re-
tained by the record title holders."
The Mississippi Supreme Court, sitting en banc, agreed that
the lakes should not be included in the public trust. 7 The court
held, however, that the other small streams and marshes38 were
subject to tidal influence, and therefore were public trust lands
under Mississippi law. 9 In this respect, the court upheld the finding
of the chancellor who had declared that the ebb and flow test con-
stituted the applicable standard. The court emphasized that the
ebb and flow doctrine represented general principles which "have
been repeated too often - here as elsewhere - to admit of seri-
ous doubt."" The court also stated that prior federal law, as well
as prior Mississippi law, dictated that the decision be based on
the ebb and flow test.' While the court acknowledged that the
present case "may arguably require that we confront for the first
time the State's claim to tidally influenced lands that were not
navigable in fact in 1817... "42 it nevertheless chose to apply
general historical principles which, in fact, extended the ebb and
flow test to its fullest spectrum. "3
The court used an historical argument to rationalize the hold-
ing. The opinion traced the history of the public trust doctrine
33. Id. at 516-17.
34. Brief for Appellant at 2, Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986), cert. grant-
ed. 107 S. Ct. 1248 (1987).
35. Avulsion is a change in boundary of a body of water so rapid that it is visible at the time of its progress.
491 So. 2d at 520.
36. Id.
37. 491 So. 2d at 510-11.
38. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also appendix 1.
39. 491 So. 2d at 514.
40. Id. at 516.
41. 491 So. 2d at 514. The Mississippi Supreme Court distinguished The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fit-
zhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851), on the theory that it represented an extension of the ebb and flow doc-
trine, not an abandonment of it. The court also cited two prior Mississippi decisions which held that all lands
within the ebb and flow of the tide vested in the state in 1817. International Paper Co. v. Mississippi State
Dep't, 271 So. 2d 395, 397-98 (Miss. 1973); Treuting v. Bridge and Park Comm'n of the City of Biloxi, 199
So. 2d 627, 632 (Miss. 1967); State ex rel. Rice v. Stewart, 184 Miss. 202, 224, 184 So. 44, 50 (1938); Rouse
v. Saucier's Heirs, 166 Miss. 704, 713, 146 So. 291, 291-92 (1933); and Money v. Wood, 152 Miss. 17,
28, 118 So. 357, 359 (1928).
42. 491 So. 2d at 516 (emphasis added).
43. Id. By refusing to consider unique facts, the court extended the ebb and flow doctrine to include insig-
nificant streams, previously thought to be privately owned. See supra note 14 and accompanying materials.
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in England, the United States and Mississippi. Under the English
common law, the public trust consisted of all lands where the tide
ebbs and flows up to the high water mark. By virtue of the Unit-
ed States' equal footing doctrine, each new state retained the same
types of land retained by the original thirteen states." Relying
on these doctrines and prior Mississippi cases, 5 the court decid-
ed that Mississippi received fee title to all lands within the ebb
and flow of the tide in 1817.6 The court then stated that the lands
which are held in trust vested in 1817 as a matter of federal law. 7
The court rejected the partnership's contention that the applicable
standard has been changed to a navigability-in-fact standard. 8 The
court believed, rather, that the navigability-in-fact standard was
intended to supplement, rather than replace the old ebb and flow
test. "[T]he navigable waters test was no new test but the removal
of an arbitrary and irrational limitation on the old ebb and flow
test."49 In the opinion of the court, the navigability-in-fact stan-
dard acts only to allow federal jurisdiction over navigable inland
waters and to allow inland states to control non-tidal navigable
rivers in trust for public use.5 According to the court, the legal
boundaries are the same for both fresh waters and tide waters.
1
The court stated that the legal boundary is the high water mark
of a navigable waterway. According to the court, if a toothpick
with a sail on it may float from a navigable water to land, then
the lands and waters over which it travels are public.52 The court
held that approximately 40 acres of the land in question fell be-
low the high water mark of the Gulf of Mexico, and thus were
vested in the state. 3 After refuting the contentions of the Part-
nership, the court held that even though application of the ebb
and flow doctrine to non-navigable waters represents a "logical
incongruity in our law,"5 history dictates that these are well set-
tled principles and, therefore, should not be disturbed.5 The court
44. The equal footing doctrine set out the manner in which new states were to be admitted to the union,
according to the Ordinance of 1789. It allowed for new states to be admitted on an equal footing with the origi-
nal states. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 222 (1845).
45. See supra note 41.
46. 491 So. 2d at 515.
47. Id. at 517.
48. See supra note 41.
49. 491 So. 2d at 515.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 515.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 510-11.
54. Id. at 517.
55. Id. at 516.
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invoked the wisdom of Justice Holmes to state that, "a page of
history is worth a volume of logic."5
ANALYSIS
In the present case, the Mississippi Supreme Court relied on
the power of history to extend the public trust doctrine to its
broadest boundaries.57 The final decision of the court allowed the
state to assert its title claim to over 40 acres of the 600 originally
claimed, under the theory that title to the 40 acres vested in the
state in 1817 as a part of the public trust.58 The court recognized
the logical incongruity that exists in the law, 9 but maintained that
in a battle between history and logic, history must win the day. °
This reasoning is based on the court's interpretation of the strength
and universal acceptance of the principles which underlie the com-
mon law.6' The case thus raises the question: Are the historical
principles which underlie the common law public trust doctrine
so firmly rooted that they demand blind adherence by the court?
The court believed that these principles are beyond question.
A close analysis of the present state of the law reveals, however,
that in other jurisdictions 3 these principles have been redefined
to make them better adhere to the topographical conditions of the
United States, and to better meet the goals of the public trust
doctrine."6
Historically, the principles supporting the public trust doctrine
date back to the early codifications of the Roman law. The Civil
Law of Rome recognized certain rights which were common to
all men.65 This civil law concept of common rights and common
56. Id. at 517 (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921)).
57. The court only concedes that the case may arguably require it to confront for the first time a state claim
to non-navigable tidal waters. Petitioners argue, however, that the trust has never before been extended to
such as those at issue. Id. at 516. See supra note 14 and accompanying materials.
58. 491 So. 2d at 510-11.
59. Id. at 517.
60. id.
61. Id. at 516.
62. Id.
63. See infra note 84.
64. The purpose of the trust is to preserve public use of waterways for the purposes of navigation, com-
merce and fishing. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894). The applicability of the principles of the public
trust to the American continent have often been questioned. See generally Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164 (1979); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
557 (1870); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (185 1); and Carson v. Blazer,
14 Pa. (2 Binn.) 475 (1810).
65. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 90-92 (T.C. Sandors trans. 7th ed. 1922): A. WATSON, THE LAW OF
THE ANCIENT ROMANS 49 (1970).
19871
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ownership applied to those things which, by their nature, required
that they be classified as common to all. The Romans placed the
right to use the air and water into this category. 6 According to
Justinian's Code:
[o]f things that are common to all anyone may take such a portion as he pleases. Thus a man may
inhale the air, or float his ship on any part of the sea. As long as he occupies any portion, his occupa-
tion is respected; but directly his occupation ceases, the thing occupied again becomes common to




Under Roman law, common things were considered extra nos-
trum pairimonium (not capable of private ownership)." The tax-
onomy of common things consisted of the following
sub-categories: Res communes (belonging to all men), res publi-
cae (belonging to the state), res nullus (belonging to no one), and
res universitatis (belonging to bodies of men).9 The public trust
doctrine originated from the two classifications, res communes
and res publicae. By the theory of res communes, certain things,
including the air, running water and the sea, belonged to all men.
The classification of res publicae provided for state ownership
of such things as roads, navigable waters and harbors.7" The Ro-
man civil law distinguished between navigable waters and tide
waters. Private landowners owned the banks of rivers, subject
to public use. The seashore, however, did not belong to any in-
dividual, but rather belonged to all men to ensure that public use
was not hindered. 7' From the philosophical foundation laid by the
ancient Romans, the concept of public use of waterways evolved
into the laws of France and Spain and from there to the common
law of England. 72
In England, the public trust doctrine reflected the supremacy
of the Crown, with the King holding title for the public benefit.
By common law, both the title and the dominion of the sea, and of rivers and arms of the sea, where
the tide ebbs and flows, and all of the lands below the high water mark, within the jurisdiction of
66. A. WATSON, THE LAW OF THE ANCIENT ROMANS 49 (1970).
67. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 91 (T.C. Sandors trans. 7th ed. 1922).
68. Id. at 90.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 91.
71. Id.
72. There is some uncertainty surrounding when the public trust concept first appeared in the English law.
I F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 61 (2d ed. 1898). One theory hypothe-
sizes that the Anglo-Saxon concept of folk-land was similar to the Roman res publicae. This theory, which
appears to have been promulgated by John Allen in 1830, was first questioned in 1893, when Vinogradoff
proposed an alternative theory that folk-land was nothing more than land governed by folk-law. T. PLUCK-
NETT, STUDIES IN ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 69 (1893).
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the Crown of England, are in the King. Such waters, and the lands they cover, either at all times,
or at least when the tide is in, are incapable of ordinary and private occupation, cultivation and im-
provement; and their natural and primary uses are public in their nature, for highways of navigation
and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose of fishing by all the King's subjects. There-
fore the title, jus privatum, in such lands, as of waste and unoccupied lands, belongs to the King as
the sovereign; and the dominion thereof, jus publicum, is vested in him as the representative of the
nation, and for the public benefit 7 3
The Crown applied this concept to the colonies in America. 4
All lands below the high water mark of navigable waters vested
in the Crown for common use. When the colonies gained indepen-
dence, the lands held by the Crown became vested in the several
states to hold in trust for public use.75 Upon the admission of each
new state into the Union, that state under the equal footing
doctrine7' became entitled to the same rights and privileges which
had been retained by the original states. Thus, the lands in the
public trust of each state which vested at the time of statehood
are equal in nature and scope to those lands retained by the origi-
nal thirteen states.
There is some confusion concerning the application of the public
trust doctrine in America.77 The confusion stems from the termi-
nology employed by the English law. In England, tidewater and
navigable water are synonymous terms.78 The question thus be-
comes whether the controlling factor in the determination of public
waters is tidal influence, or navigability-in-fact. Several United
States cases have held that navigability is the controlling factor. 9
One of the first cases to recognize this was the 1810 Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court decision of Carson v. Blazer.0 In that case,
the court stated that "[tihis definition [ebb and flow] may be very
proper in England, where there is no river of considerable im-
portance as to navigation which has not . . . [the ebb and] flow
of the tide; but it would be highly unreasonable when applied to
our large rivers.""1 The United States Supreme Court in The Daniel
Ball, 2 likewise stated "[t]he doctrine of the common law as to
the navigability of waters has no application in this country. Here
73. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I, 11 (1894).
74. Id. at 14-15.
75. Id. at 15.
76. The equal footing doctrine provided that each new state would be admitted into the union with all of
the same rights and privileges retained by the original thirteen states. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 212, 222 (1845); Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986), cert. grant-
ed, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987).
77. See supra note 16.
78. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 455 (1851).
79. See supra note 64.
80. 14 Pa. (2 Binn.) 475 (1810).
81. id. at 478.
82. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
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the ebb and flow of the tide do not constitute the usual test, as
in England, or any test at all of the navigability of waters."83 Since
these decisions, twelve out of sixteen of the traditional common
law jurisdictions on the eastern seaboard have either modified or
rejected the literal application of the common law ebb and flow
test. 
84
The Mississippi court does not modify or reject the ebb and
flow test, but rather predicates its decision on the strength of this
historic test.8" The court holds that because the Gulf of Mexico
is navigable as a whole, any Mississippi tidewaters should be con-
sidered navigable.8" It is clear from the map of the area, however,
that the connection of the waters in question to the Gulf of Mexi-
co is indirect.87 It would be impossible to get from any of these
waters to the Gulf of Mexico without first going through a series
of rivers and bayous.88 The court says, however, that as long as
a toothpick with a sail on it may travel from the navigable area
to the land, the waters and the lands beneath them are public.89
The court states that by this high water mark rationale, the legal
boundaries of tidewaters and freshwaters are the same.9" The court
also recognizes, however, that the lands under freshwaters, not
83. id. at 563.
84. Twelve of the sixteen east coast jurisdictions have either changed or abandoned the traditional ebb and
flow doctrine. Florida employs a navigability-in-fact standard; Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 563, 112 So.
274, 283 (1927); Bucki v. Cone, 25 Fla. 1, 18-19, 6 So. 160, 161 (1889). Georgia likewise uses a navigability-
in-fact standard; GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1307-08 (Harrison 1978). South Carolina has also rejected the ebb
and flow doctrine in favor of navigability-in-fact; State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50 (1884). North Caroli-
na has also abandoned the ebb and flow doctrine; Swan Island Club, Inc. v. White, 114 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C.
1953), affd, 209 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1954). Virginia has modified the landowners' rights to extend to the mean
low water mark; VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-2 (1982). Maryland allows for private ownership of tidal lands; MD.
NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 9-201 (1983). Massachusetts allows for private ownership to the low water mark,
subject to a public easement; Butler v. Attorney General, 195 Mass. 79, 83-84, 80 N.E. 688, 689 (1907).
New Hampshire applies a navigability-in-fact standard; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271:9 (1977). Maine re-
quires that waters be useful for the purpose of trade and agriculture to be defined as public; Brown v. Chad-
bourne, 31 Me. 9, 15 (1849). Pennsylvania has also abandoned the ebb and flow test; Carson v. Blazer, 14
Pa. (2 Binn.) 475, 482 (1810). Vermont classifies "boatable" waters as public; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 67. Boata-
ble waters are defined as navigable-in-fact; New England Trout & Salmon Club v. Mather, 68 Vt. 338, 345,
35 A. 323, 324-25 (1896). New York allows for the sale of tidelands which are no longer navigable; N.Y.
PUB. LANDs LAW § 75 (12) (McKinney 1951) (Supp. 1986). Delaware law is unclear concerning tidal owner-
ship. Connecticut follows the common law ebb and flow doctrine; Shorefront Park Improvement Ass'n v. King,
157 Conn. 249, 257, 253 A.2d 29, 33 (1968). Rhode Island also follows the common law doctrine; Jackvony
v. Powel, 67 R.I. 218, 226-27, 21 A.2d 554, 557 (1941). New Jersey likewise follows the common law doc-
trine; O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't, 50 N.J. 307, 323, 235 A.2d 1,9 (1967). Butsee Porro & Teleky, Marsh-
land Title Dilemma: A Tidal Phenomenon, 3 SETON HALL 323 (1972).
85. 491 So. 2d at 516.
86. Id. at 514.
87. See appendix 1.
88. See appendix 1.




navigable-in-fact, are outside of the public trust and are there-
fore susceptible to private ownership.91 This statement is incon-
sistent with the toothpick ship criterion because, by that rationale,
any water which flows into a navigable water through any num-
ber of channels is a navigable public water. This means that any
flowing water, whether fresh or salt, would have to be public,
for even the smallest stream is in some way connected to a larger
navigable stream. The court's holding is that the navigable waters
test did not replace the ebb and flow test, but merely extended
it to fresh waters;9 2 but if the test is the same for salt and fresh
waters, it is not logical to place any flowing stream outside of
the public trust. Nevertheless, the court states "[t]o be sure, shal-
low, non-navigable freshwater streams and the beds beneath same
are under our law susceptible of private ownership."9 3 This reason-
ing only supports the proposition that navigability-in-fact should
be the controlling factor in the determination of a public water-
way in Mississippi.
The court cites several Mississippi cases which expressly state
that the ebb and flow test is the applicable test in Mississippi,"
and states that the principles set out in prior cases control this
case in spite of its unique facts. 5 The Partnership argued that this
was a case of first impression, and as such, should be distinguish-
able from prior cases." The court in rejecting that contention em-
phasized that state law is controlling and that the history of the
law in Mississippi dictates that all tidelands belong to the state. 7
This proposition is stated in Money v. Wood,98 where the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court held that the title to tidelands vested in the
several states upon statehood and could be transferred only when
the transfer would not impair the public use.99 This rule of law
is repeated in a number of other Mississippi cases, including State
ex rel. Rice v. Stewart (1938);1" Rouse v. Saucier's Heirs (1933);o'
and International Paper Co. v. Mississippi State Highway Depart-
ment (1973), °2 all of which the court relied on in rationalizing
91. Id. at 517.
92. Id. at 515.
93. Id. at 517.
94. See supra note 41.
95. 491 So. 2d at 516.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 152 Miss. 17, 28, 118 So. 357, 359 (1928).
99. Id., 118 So. at 359.
100. 184 Miss. 202, 230, 184 So. 44, 50 (1938).
101. 166 Miss. 704, 713, 146 So. 291, 291-92 (1933).
102. 271 So. 2d 395, 397 (Miss. 1973) (quoting, Money v. Wood, 152 Miss. 17, 28, 118 So. 357. 359 (1928)).
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its holding." 3 While the court finds a consistent rule of law in
these cases, this line of cases has been criticized as inconsistent."
The inconsistency stems from the holding in the 1967 case of
Treuting v. Bridge and Park Commission. "o In Treuting, the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court allowed land on the west end of Deer Is-
land which had previously been held inalienable to be sold to
private developers. Nearly forty years earlier the property locat-
ed on the west end of Deer Island had been held to be public trust
land in Money v. Wood (1928)." In Money, the court had held
that section 81 of the Mississippi Constitution prohibited the sale
of land underlying any of the navigable waters of the state.1"7 The
Treuting court premised its decision on the theory that, "[tihe con-
text of section 81 is directed toward free navigation. It has noth-
ing to do with the alienation of mud flats and waters not suitable
for navigation in fact, or the sale of submerged lands."'" The court
observed that the constitutional provision prohibiting the sale of
submerged lands was not applicable, because the public trust was
strictly a common law doctrine.0 9 This inconsistency between
Treuting and Money demonstrates that the law in Mississippi is
not settled beyond question.
The land in issue in Bambini is not directly connected to the
Gulf of Mexico or to any other waterway used for the purpose
of navigation.110 No other Mississippi cases deal with lands situ-
ated in such a position. By refusing to consider the unique facts
of the case,1 the court declined an opportunity to bring Missis-
sippi law in line with that of a majority of coastal jurisdictions
which no longer apply a strict ebb and flow standard."'
While the Mississippi Supreme Court relied on prior Missis-
sippi cases and the English common law in reaching its decision,
it did not explore the evolution of the public trust doctrine in the
United States." 3 The English common law definition of the pub-
103. 491 So. 2d at 516.
104. Comment, The Mississippi Public Trust Doctrine: Public and Private Rights in the Coastal Zone, 46
Miss. L.J. 84 (1975).
105. 199 So. 2d 627 (Miss. 1967).
106. 152 Miss. 17, 29, 118 So. 357, 358-59 (1928).
107. Id. at 30, 118 So. at 360.
108. 199 So. 2d at 632.
109. Id.
110. See appendix I.
Ill. 491 So. 2d at 516.
112. See supra note 84.
113. The court distinguished the holding of The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
443 (1851), as an expansion of the ebb and flow doctrine. The court did not, however, distinguish the similar
holding in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. EIlinois, 146 U.S.
387 (1892); and The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
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lic trust was well suited to the topographical conditions existing
in England. The original colonies as British subjects adopted the
English common law definition. This definition is not, however,
at all suited to the topographical conditions which exist in the
United States." ' One of the earliest cases to recognize the un-
suitability in the United States of the English common law defi-
nition of the public trust was the 1810 Pennsylvania case of Carson
v. Blazer."' That case held that navigability-in-fact provided a
better standard for defining public waters in this country than did
the English standard." 6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
[blut the uniform idea has ever been, that only such parts of the common law as were applicable to
our local situation have been received in this government. The principle is self-evident. The adoption
of a different rule would, in the language of Sir Dudley Ryder, resemble the unskillful physician, who
prescribes the same remedy to every species of disease."
7
The holding in Carson v. Blazer places some doubt on the find-
ing of the Mississippi court that the ebb and flow doctrine is an
unquestioned federal principle. The issue then turns to the deter-
mination of exactly what lands were granted to the state in 1817.
The historical support for the ebb and flow test comes from the
English common law." 8 Under the ebb and flow test, the state
claims all land where the tide ebbs and flows to the mean high
water mark." 9 While history is supportive of this position to a
degree, history also reveals some confusion over which lands
passed to the states at the time of statehood."0
The confusion surrounding the public trust has its foundation
in the topographical differences between the United States and
England, and in the actual definitions of the terms employed by
the law. According to the United States Supreme Court in The
Propeller Genesee Chief 2' in England the ebb and flow test was:
a sound and reasonable one, because there was no navigable stream in the country beyond the ebb
and flow of the tide .... In England, therefore tide-water and navigable water are synonymous terms,
and tide-water, with a few small and unimportant exceptions, meant nothing more than public rivers.
1 22
The Mississippi Supreme Court distinguished this case by stat-
ing that the navigability-in-fact standard represented nothing more
114. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436 (1892); Carson v. Blazer, 14 Pa. (2 Binn.) 475,
477 (1810).
115. 14 Pa. (2 Binn.) 475, 477.
116. Id. at 478.
117. Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 477.
119. 491 So. 2d at 514.
120. See supra note 12.
121. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454-55 (1851).
122. Id.
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than an extension of the ebb and flow doctrine. 23 It may be ar-
gued, however, that the Court in The Genesee Chief adopted a
view similar to that expressed by the Pennsylvania court in Car-
son v. Blazer."' In Carson, the court had expressly stated that
the common law concerning public waters had no application in
this country, and that "since the revolution, no part of the com-
mon law has thus been adopted except that which was proper for
our country."'25
The Pennsylvania chief justice observed that the ebb and flow
doctrine would be "highly unreasonable when applied to our large
rivers, such as the Ohio, Allegheny, Delaware, Schuylkill or
Susquehanna and its branches."'2 A concurring opinion agreed
that "[T]he qualities of fresh or salt water cannot amongst us, de-
termine whether a river shall be deemed navigable or not. Neither
can the flux or reflux of the tides ascertain its character." 27
The United States Supreme Court further buttressed the ideas
embodied in Carson and The Genesee Chief in the 1892 case of
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois. 1 8 In that case, the Supreme
Court applied the rationale used in Carson and The Genesee Chief
to hold that navigability-in-fact was the proper test for determi-
nation of public and private lands. The Court stated:
[w]hen the reason of the limitation of admiralty jurisdiction in England was found inapplicable to the
condition of navigable waters in this country, the limitation and all its incidents were discarded. So
also, by common law, the doctrine of the dominion over and ownership by the crown of lands within
the realm under tide waters is not founded upon the existence of the tide over the lands, but upon
the fact that the waters are navigable, tide waters and navigable, as already said, being used as synony-
mous terms in England.
1 29
The previously cited authorities suggest a redefinition of the
English common law test to make it applicable to conditions in
the United States. The confusion that permeates the history of the
public trust in the United States casts doubt on the rationale used
by the Mississippi court in Bambini.
The United States Supreme Court recognized the confusion sur-
rounding the law of tide waters in the case of Kaiser Aetna v.
United States. 30 In that case, a question arose as to the owner-
ship of a tidally influenced marina, created when an artificial chan-
nel was constructed to connect a tidally influenced inland pond
123. 491 So. 2d at 515.
124. 14 Pa. (2 Binn.) 475.
125. Id. at 477.
126. Id. at 478.
127. Id. at 485.
128. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
129. Id. at 436.
130. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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to a nearby bay." The United States and the State of Hawaii sought
to claim the marina on a theory that navigability placed it within
the public trust."' The United States Supreme Court held that the
pond was private property and agreed with the private developers
that "the ebb and flow test was abandoned by The Propeller
Genesee Chief and The Daniel Ball in favor of navigability in
fact." 33 In effect, the United States Supreme Court refused to
recognize the viability of the strict ebb and flow doctrine as later
set forth by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Bambini.
Since the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the
common law ebb and flow test is not applicable in this country,'
the question for consideration is what federal law controlled dis-
position of the trust lands in 1817. The answer to this question
is determinative of what lands actually belong to the state. A good
starting point is an examination of the equal footing doctrine. The
equal footing doctrine provided that upon admission to the union
each new state would be entitled to the same rights and privileges
as the original thirteen states."' Determination of the rights re-
tained by the original thirteen states should define the lands which
vested in the State of Mississippi in 1817.
In regard to the historical soundness of the ebb and flow test,
the Mississippi court is in the minority. Several of the original
states have adopted a navigability-in-fact standard" or have deviat-
ed from the common law test by other means.' The Mississippi
Supreme Court fails to recognize that a majority of coastal states
no longer follow the ebb and flow test.'38 Instead, the court relies
only on the history of the ebb and flow test as it existed in En-
gland and on prior Mississippi cases in making its decision."' The
applicability of the English ebb and flow test in the United States
has, however, long been considered suspect.'
131. Id. Prior to the construction of the channel, the property had been privately owned as far back as the
days of the Hawaiian Kings. Id. at 166-67. This fact is at odds with the Mississippi decision, because the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court refused to consider whether the land was public trust land even though the tide had
ebbed and flowed in the non-navigable pond. Id. at 166.
132. 444 U.S. at 165-66.
133. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 182 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134. See supra note 64.
135. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 222 (1845).
136. See supra note 84.
137. See supra note 84.
138. The court states that the ebb and flow doctrine is an unquestioned principle. 491 So. 2d at 516.
139. Id.
140. See supra note 16.
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In England, the ebb and flow of the tide represented a way to
determine navigability, the critical factor being not the influence
of the tide, but rather the navigable character of the waterway."' 1
By holding that the navigability test is an extension of the ebb
and flow test, the Mississippi court further entrenches the logical
incongruity in our law."4 2 The historical principles underlying the
public trust doctrine do not demand the result reached by the court.
A more soundly reasoned decision would have abandoned the ar-
bitrary and irrational ebb and flow test in favor of a navigability-
in-fact test. A discussion of the possible implications of the Bam-
bini decision will reveal that the court would have been wiser to
consider applying a navigability-in-fact standard to define Mis-
sissippi trust lands. "3
The Bambini decision is based in part on Mississippi case law."
These Mississippi decisions, however, do not address ownership
of the type of land at issue in the present case.' The court ad-
mits that the facts of the case are unique but notes that regardless
of what unique facts exist, general ebb and flow principles will
control.' The court may have failed to realize, however, the pos-
sible effects of the precedent set by this decision. By holding that
the lands in question belong to the state, the supreme court es-
sentially places a cloud over the title to all coastal lands which
have tidally affected inlets or marshes included in the record
deeds.' If the state may assert dominion over previously un-
claimed lands at any time, the record deed is not secure.
Under the laws of real property, many complications may arise
from the decision of the court. The idea of free alienation of real
property is a respected doctrine of common law property in the
United States.' The court's decision discourages free alienation
of Mississippi coastal property, in that it threatens the security
of titles. An insecure title is not readily marketable and, there-
fore, is not freely alienable. Expensive marine surveys may pro-
141. Tide water and navigable water are synonymous terms at English common law, The Propeller Genesee
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 455 (1851). The doctrine of public ownership is not founded upon
the existence of tide over lands, but upon the fact that the waters are navigable. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436 (1892).
142. The court recognizes that the ebb and flow test represents a logical incongruity in the law, but neverthe-
less upholds the test. 491 So. 2d at 517.
143. A similar holding in New Jersey caused multiple complications involving the determinations of property
lines. Porro & Teleky, Marshland Title Dilemma: A Tidal Phenomenon, 3 SETON HALL 323 (1972).
144. See supra note 41.
145. The Mississippi Supreme Court refused to consider the unique facts of the case, but chose instead to
proceed on general principles. 491 So. 2d at 516.
146. Id.
147. Brief for Appellant at 5, Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986), cert grant-
ed. 107 S. Ct. 1248 (1987).




vide the only means for a landowner to secure title. In the Bambini
case, the total surveying costs exceeded $300,000.49 The deci-
sion of the court also necessarily discourages alienation of property
in the form of leases, especially mineral leases. In order to lease
mineral rights, the landowner must have an interest in them. If
this interest cannot be determined without expensive surveys, it
may not be economically feasible to lease these mineral rights.
Moreover, if the state wished to lease mineral rights under tide
waters and if the property were held in record deed by an individu-
al, the state would have to bear the survey costs involved to claim
its title.1 50 Either way, the costs could outweigh the benefits.
The possibility of uninsurable title will also act to compound
alienation problems. Title insurance companies do not want to
insure insecure titles. Uninsurable titles are not as marketable as
clear titles and, therefore, are not as freely alienable.5' On these
points, the court's holding conflicts with settled ideas of real
property law.1 '
It logically follows that private landowners who have been pay-
ing taxes on tidally-influenced property should be relieved of the
tax burdens carried by the property." In the present case, pri-
vate landowners had paid taxes for over 150 years on the property
held to belong to the state.1" ' If there is no justification for re-
quiring coastal landowners to continue paying taxes on land which
may be deemed state property,"' then the state could experience
a decline in revenue in the form of lost taxes.
The types of problems which could arise from the holding of
the court in the instant case were addressed after the court hand-
ed down a similar decision in International Paper Co. v. Missis-
sippi State Highway Department."5 6 In International Paper, the
court allowed the state to assert title to property which had previ-
ously been considered private. A comment on that case recog-
149. Brief for Appellant at 7, Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986), cert. granted.
107 S. Ct. 1248 (1987).
150. In New Jersey, where the state asserted a claim to previously unclaimed meadowlands, the burden of
proof of ownership was placed on the state. Porro & Teleky, Marshland Title Dilemma: A Tidal Phenomenon,
3 SETON HALL 323, 331 (1972).
151. Title insurance represents an agreement on the part of the insurer to indemnify the insured for any
loss due to title deficiency. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE AND DEVELOP-
MENT 215 (2d ed. 1981). To insure encumbered titles would be against the interest of these companies.
152. See supra note 148.
153. The question arises as to whether petitioners would have a cause of action to recover the amount paid
in taxes over the last 150 years.
154. Brief for Appellant at 5, Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986), cer. granted.
107 S. Ct. 1248 (1987).
155. The State's delay in asserting its claim will not give rise to an estoppel. 491 So. 2d at 52 1.
156. 271 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 1972). See Comment, The Mississippi Public Trust Doctrine: Public and Private
Rights in the Coastal Zone, 46 Miss. L.J. 84 (1975).
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nized that coastal landowners would have no way to know whether
or not they were paying taxes on state property. 157 The comment
also recognized that long-time apparent coastal landowners might
suffer from the decision.15 The Bambini partners are an example
of such long-time apparent owners.
A dissent to International Paper also recognized the possible
ramifications of such a mechanical application of the ebb and flow
test.159 The dissenting justice asked "[d]o such facts, however, if
they exist, render void title to all portions of the land bought and
held in good faith by a succession of owners over a period of many
years? The consequences of such a rule are incapable of being
known, measured or foreseen." 6
The navigability-in-fact standard provided the court with a legiti-
mate option to maintain the status quo for private landowners.161
The navigability-in-fact standard is well represented throughout
the history of the public trust doctrine in America." 2 An applica-
tion of that test would have provided for private ownership of
non-navigable waters and public ownership of all navigable waters
regardless of tidal influence. This standard is more rational and
less arbitrary than the ebb and flow test, which provides for pub-
lic ownership of all tide waters, regardless of navigability, and
all waters that are navigable-in-fact, and for private ownership
of non-navigable fresh waters. The history of the public trust doc-
trine in America does not support this decision. 3
CONCLUSION
A survey of the available authorities indicates that the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court could have rationally decided to maintain
the ebb and flow test on the basis of its historical foundation, or
could have opted for the logically supported navigability-in-fact
standard. The court chose the former option on the theory that
157. Comment, The Mississippi Public Trust Doctrine: Public and Private Rights in the Coastal Zone, 46
Miss. L.J. 84, 111 (1975).
158. Id.
159. 271 So. 2d 395, 400 (1975) (Smith, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 401.
161. The lands had not been previously claimed by the state and were treated as private property for over
150 years. Brief for Appellant at I, Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986), cert.
granted. 107 S. Ct. 1248 (1987).
162. See supra note 84.
163. See supra notes 16 and 84.
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"a page of history is worth a volume of logic."1 " The wiser deci-
sion would seem to have been to follow the more logical stan-
dard and maintain the status quo of the coastal property. The
wisdom of Justice Holmes is in support of the historical argu-
ment, but would it not be better to invoke the wisdom of Justice
Holmes for the proposition that "[i]t is revolting to have no better
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time
of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past."1 5
Peter Larkin Doran
164. The court refers to this quote made by Justice Holmes in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S.
345, 349 (1921).
165. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
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APPENDIX 1
uiwy
Taken from Appendix A of Appellant's brief. The designations C-1 through C-11 indicate the
lands claimed by the State. The perimeter line maps the 2400 acre tract.
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